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PANAGIOTIS SOTIRIS 
The laboratory of philosophy. 
Gramsci and Althusser on philosophy 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Louis Althusser’s critique of Antonio Gramsci’s concept of the “philosophy of 
praxis” is one of the supposedly definite dividing lines between different Marxist 
traditions, one more associated with emphasis on structural determinations and 
theoretical anti-humanism and one associated with emphasis on historical praxis, human 
agency and praxis. Based upon a parallel reading of Gramsci’s definitions of “philosophy 
of praxis” in the Prison Notebooks and Louis Althusser’s recently published Initiation to 
Philosophy for non-philosophers, I will try to show that despite their differences both Gramsci 
and Althusser shared a similar conception of philosophy as a theoretical and conceptual 
laboratory for the development of forms of hegemony. 
 
 
2. Gramsci and philosophy of praxis 
 
In Gramsci’s work the question of the theoretical status of philosophy is related 
to his more general project of a theory of hegemony1, something evident in the interplay 
between the notions of ethico-political history, coming from the work of Croce, of 
hegemony and of philosophy of praxis.  
 
One can say that not only the philosophy of praxis does not exclude ethico-political history, but 
that, indeed, in its most recent stage of development it consists precisely in asserting the moment of 
hegemony as essential to its conception of the state and in attaching “full weight” to the cultural factor,  
to cultural activity, to the necessity for a cultural front alongside the merely economic and merely 
political ones (Q10, §7; FSPN : 345)2. 
 
Gramsci insisted on the originality of Marxism. He stresses that the “affirmation 
that Marxism is a new, independent philosophy is the affirmation of the independence 
and originality of a new culture in incubation that will develop with the development of 
                                                                 
1 On the articulation between philosophy, politics and hegemony in Gramsci see Ch. Buci-Glucksmann, 
Gramsci and the State, transl. by D. Fernbach, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1980; F. Frosini, Gramsci  e  
la filosofia. Saggio sui Quaderni del carcere, Rome, Carocci, 2003; P. D. Thomas, The Gramscian Moment. 
Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism, Leiden, Brill, 2009; A. Burgio, Gramsci. Il sistema in movimento, Roma, 
Derive Approdi 2014. 
2 Following the standard in references to Gramsci ’s Quaderni, we use Notebook number (Q) and 
paragraph (§) to refer to the critical Italian edition (Gramsci 1975) and abbreviations to refer to the 
English translations: SPN for Selections from Prison Notebooks (edited by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell  Smith,  
London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971) and FSPN for Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks (ed. by 
Derek. Boothman, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1996), PN for Prison Notebooks (translated by J. 
Buttigieg, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007).  
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social relations” (Q4, §3; PN II: 144). Gramsci is fully aware of the relation between 
philosophy and mass ideological practices, when he refers to “the ‘philosophy of the 
age’, that is, of the mass of sentiments [and conceptions of the world] prevalent among 
the ‘silent’ multitude” (Q5, §54; PN II: 313). That is why he insisted upon the relation of 
“common sense” to philosophy3. Common sense “is the ‘philosophy of 
nonphilosophers’ – in other words, the conception of the world acritically absorbed from 
the various social environments in which the moral individuality of the average person is 
developed. […] It is the ‘folklore’ of philosophy” (Q8, §173; PN III: 333). Only when a 
theory or worldview manages to remain in contact with people, it becomes actually 
effective: “Only through this contact does a philosophy become ‘historical’, cleanse itself 
of elements that are ‘individual’ in origin, and turn itself into ‘life’” (Q8, §213; PN III: 
360). This leads to Gramsci’s insistence that “all men are philosophers”(Q8, §204; PN 
III: 352). Philosophy becomes synonym to a certain form of intellectuality that 
accompanies all forms of human activity and social practice and is itself one of the stakes 
of social antagonism. 
 
There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded:  
homo faber cannot be separated from homo sapiens. Each man, finally, outside his professional activity, 
carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is he is a ‘philosopher’, an artist a man of taste, he 
participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and 
therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being 
new modes of thought (Q12, §3; SPN: 9). 
 
Consequently “philosophy cannot be separated from the history of philosophy, 
nor can culture from the history of culture” (Q11, §12; SPN: 324). The actual historical 
efficacy of any new emerging philosophy and conception of the world is to be judged by 
the extent to which it affects the mass ideological practices of the subaltern classes.  
 
For a mass of people to be led to think coherently and in the same coherent fashion about the 
real present world, is a “philosophical” event far more important and ‘original’ than the discovery by 
some philosophical “genius” of a truth which remains the property of small groups of intellectuals 
(Q11, §12; SPN: 325). 
 
This relation between philosophy and “common sense”, theoretical abstraction 
and mass ideological practices is itself a part of the political process. “The relation 
between common sense and the upper level of philosophy is assured by ‘politics’” (Q11, 
§12; SPN: 331), although this does not imply a symmetry between different philosophies 
as class conceptions of the world: “The philosophy of praxis does not tend to leave the 
“simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a 
higher conception of life” (Q11, §12; SPN: 332). The emergence of a new conception 
and practice of philosophy is by itself an aspect of the emergence of a new hegemonic 
                                                                 
3 On the importance of the relationship between philosophy and common sense as part of the broader 
“pedagogical” role of the communist party in the attempt towards a new form of mass intellectuality 
and civility see F. Frosini, Gramsci e la filosofia, cit., pp. 170-176. See also G. Liguori, Sentieri gramsciani, 
Rome, Carocci, 2006, pp. 79-82. 
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project, which also means that philosophy is transformed by the emergence of a new 
proletarian hegemony. “This is why it must be stressed that the political development of 
the concept of hegemony represents a great philosophical advance as well as a politico -
practical one” (Q11, §12; SPN: 333). 
Gramsci’s identification between philosophy and history should not be seen as an 
identification of theory with its subject matter, which was one of the targets of 
Althusser’s critique in 19654, but as an acknowledgement of the importance of the 
relation of politics and theory, and a conception of theory as being part of an historical 
process and its dynamics. This is also important since ideology and discourse practices 
are part of the historical process and its dynamics. 
 
Ideologies, rather, are the “true” philosophy since they are then those philosophical 
“popularisations” that lead the masses to concrete action, to the transformation of reality. In other 
words, they are the mass aspect of every philosophical conception, which in the “philosopher” assumes 
the characteristics of an abstract universality, divorced from time and space, the characteristics peculiar 
to a literary and anti-historical origin (Q10II, §2; FSPN: 382-3). 
 
When Gramsci chose to refer to philosophy of praxis, this was not a metonymy 
for historical materialism nor an attempt to avoid prison censors5. Gramsci consciously 
chose the reference to philosophy instead of science in an attempt to distinguish 
philosophy of praxis from a simple sociological scientism. This is not an 
underestimation of theory or of a scientific approach to political economy and social 
relations in general. The elaboration of a new proletarian hegemonic apparatus requires 
the elaboration of a new conceptual apparatus, an elaboration, which is not simply a 
theoretical, but also historical and political translation of historical and political 
dynamics. The realization of hegemonic apparatus, to the extent that it creates a new 
ideological terrain, determines a reform of consciences and methods of knowledge, 
constitutes a knowledge fact, a philosophical event: “The realization of a hegemonic 
apparatus, in so far as it creates a new ideological terrain, determines a reform of 
consciousness and of methods of knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a philosophical 
fact” (Q10II, §12; SPN: 365-66). 
For Gramsci “philosophy in general does not in fact exist” (Q11, §12; SPN: 326); 
only different and antagonistic philosophies and conceptions of the world  exist. 
Consequently, what prevails in each particular era is a balance of forces between 
different philosophical tendencies but also between different ideologies and theoretical 
practices. “Therefore the philosophy of an epoch cannot be any systematic tendency or 
individual system. It is the ensemble of all individual philosophies and philosophical 
tendencies, plus scientific opinions, religion and common sense” (Q11, §16; SPN: 455). 
And every philosopher is in a constant and dialectical relation to his  or her social and 
political environment: “One could say therefore that the historical personality of an 
                                                                 
4 L. Althusser, É. Balibar, Reading Capital, transl. by B. Brewster, London, New Left Books, 1970. 
5 On this I am following Peter Thomas’ arguments against treating the language and terminology of the 
Quaderni as Gramsci’s way to avoid prison censors (P. D. Thomas, The Gramscian Moment. Philosophy, 
Hegemony and Marxism, cit.). 
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individual philosopher is also given by the active relationship which exists between him 
and the cultural environment he is proposing to modify” (Q10II, §44; SPN: 350). That is 
why the history of traditional philosophy, the history of the philosophies of the 
philosophers is the history of the attempt to correct, transform, and perfect existing 
worldviews.  
 
The history of philosophy as it is generally understood, that is as the history of philosophers’ 
philosophies, is the history of attempts made and ideological initiatives undertaken by a specific class of 
people to change, correct or perfect the conceptions of the world that exist in any particular age and 
thus to change the norms of conduct that go with them; in other words, to change practical activity as a 
whole (Q10II, §17; SPN: 344). 
 
One of the tasks of a philosophy of praxis is to historicize philosophies and 
conceptions of the world. “The intention of the philosophy of praxis, in contrast, is to 
justify […] the historicity of philosophies, a historicity that is dialectical because it gives 
rise to struggles between systems, to struggles between ways of seeing reality”(Q10II, 
§41i; FSPN: 413). Idealist philosophy is for Gramsci a philosophy that attempts to 
organize consent in favor of the dominant classes, linked to the process of bourgeois 
State formation, the role of intellectuals in this process and the transformation of 
hegemony in an era of passive revolution.  
 
The problem can be formulated as follows: since the State is the concrete form of a productive 
world and since the intellectuals are the social element from which the governing personnel is drawn, 
the intellectual who is not firmly anchored to a strong economic group will tend to present the State  as 
an absolute; in this way the function of the intellectuals is itself conceived of as absolute and pre -
eminent, and their historical existence and dignity are abstractly rationalised. This motive is 
fundamental for an historical understanding of modern philosophical idealism, and is connected with 
the mode of formation of the modern States of continental Europe as “reaction-national 
transcendence” of the French Revolution (a motive which is essential for understanding the concepts 
of “passive revolution” and “revolution/restoration”, and for grasping the importance of the Hegelian 
comparison between the principles of Jacobinism and classical German philosophy) (Q10II, §6; SPN: 
117). 
 
It is obvious that for Gramsci a definition of philosophy cannot be simply 
theoretical, nor can it be thought in terms of a traditional theoretical division of labour 
between science and philosophy (as theory of knowledge, ontology and ethics). On the 
contrary, the theoretical efficacy of a philosophical proposition has to do with how it 
affects the popular masses. “Mass adhesion or non-adhesion to an ideology is the real 
critical test of the rationality and historicity of modes of thinking” (Q11, §12; SPN: 341). 
This is what leads Gramsci to the identification of philosophy and history that Althusser 
considered the epitome of historicism. 
 
The philosophy of an historical epoch is, therefore, nothing other than the “history” of that 
epoch itself, nothing other than the mass of variations that the leading group has succeeded in 
imposing on preceding reality. History and philosophy are in this sense indivisible : they form a bloc 
(Q10II, §17: SPN: 345). 
 
4
Décalages, Vol. 2 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol2/iss1/4
5 
The philosophy of praxis is an attempt towards a philosophy that is not a 
“walking anachronism”, a “future philosophy which will be that of a human race united 
the world over” (Q11, §12; SPN: 324); a philosophy for communism. Philosophy of praxis 
is a philosophy of historical contradiction and a form of struggle of the subaltern classes 
to gain social and political power.  
 
The philosophy of praxis, on the other hand, does not aim at the peaceful resolution of exist ing 
contradictions. It is not the instrument of government of the dominant groups in order to gain the 
consent of and exercise hegemony over the subaltern classes; it is the expression of these subaltern 
classes who want to educate themselves in the art of government and who have an interest in knowi ng 
all truths, even the unpleasant ones, and in avoiding the (impossible) deceptions of the upper class and 
– even more – their own (Q10II, §41xii; FSPN: 395-6). 
 
Philosophy of praxis is “materialist” in the sense of a break with any form of 
metaphysical dualism and Gramsci insists on the polemical character of the very term 
materialism, in the form of “the more extended meaning that it acquired polemically in 
the debates that grew up in Europe with the rise and victorious development of modem 
culture” (Q11, §16; SPN: 454). At the same time, in his polemic against Bukharin’s 
manual he is highly critical of any “philosophical alias metaphysical or mechanical 
(vulgar) materialism” (Q11, §22; SPN: 434)6. Because of all the metaphysical 
connotations associated with materialism as a potential “philosophical system”, Gramsci 
in many instances prefers to refer to immanence and what he describes as an 
immanentist tradition in philosophy. As Frosini7 and Thomas8 have shown, the 
emergence of the importance of immanence is related to Gramsci’s attempt to confront 
crucial aspects of a non-metaphysical and non-deterministic conception of social 
practices, expressed in crucial notions such as “homo oeconomicus”, “determinate market”  
and “tendential law” that Gramsci uses in his attempt to theorize social relations and 
forms in the economy. 
 
The discovery of the formal logical principle of the “law of tendency” which leads to the 
scientific definition of the fundamental economic concepts of homo oeconomicus and of the “determined 
market”, was this not also a discovery of epistemological value as well ? Does it not precisely simply a  
new “immanence”, a new conception of “necessity” and of freedom, etc.? (Q10II; SPN: 401)9. 
 
As a new and original way to conceive of philosophy as a theoretical activity, 
philosophy of praxis should not be seen through the lens of a traditional distinction 
between pure philosophy on the one hand and economics and politics on the other. In 
contrast, it is a complex theoretical approach to historical reality. 
 
                                                                 
6 On Gramsci’s criticism of Bukharin see F. Frosini, Gramsci e la filosofia, cit. 
7 F. Frosini, “Immanenza” in G. Liguori, P. Voza (eds.) Dizionario gramsciano 1926-1937, Rome, Carocci ,  
2009. 
8 P. D. Thomas, The Gramscian Moment. Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism, cit. 
9 According to Burgio (Gramsci. Il sistema in movimento, cit., pp. 96-97) we can see important references to 
immanence already in the “Ordine Nuovo” texts. 
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This means that, after having accomplished the principal task in the general philosophical part,  
which deals with the philosophy of praxis proper-the science of dialectics or the theory of knowledge, 
within which the general concepts of history, politics and economics are interwoven in an organic 
unity.(Q11, §33; SPN: 431). 
 
And if objectivity is the goal of an immanentist philosophy in sharp contrast to 
any idealism, in the sense of emancipation from ideological miscognition, then 
objectivity as aim and communism as a political goal are part of the same historical 
process. Objectivity as emancipation from ideology is at the end of the process that leads 
to communism.  
 
Objective always means “humanly objective” which can be held to correspond exactly to 
“historically subjective”: in other words, objective would mean “universal subjective”. Man knows 
objectively in so far as knowledge is real for the whole human race historically unified in a single unitary 
cultural system. But this process of historical unification takes place through the disappearance of the 
internal contradictions which tear apart human society, while these contradictions themselves are the 
condition for the formation of groups and for the birth of ideologies which are not concretely universal 
but are immediately rendered transient by the practical origin of their substance. There exists therefore 
a struggle for objectivity (to free oneself from partial and fallacious ideologies) and this struggle is the 
same as the struggle for the cultural unification of the human race. (Q11, §17; SPN: 445). 
 
If philosophy is linked to forms of social and political intellectuality, the many 
ways with which ordinary people deal with the realities of life and social antagonism, and 
if mass intellectuality is one of the main stakes of the struggle for hegemony, then a 
philosophy of praxis is an integral part of this attempt towards mass critical 
intellectuality, an attempt that is also integrally linked to the elaboration of new forms of 
mass politics and in particular the emergence of the mass party (and of course the 
proletarian party). The following passages, coming from one of Gramsci’s most dense 
notes on philosophy (Q11, §12), exemplify this complex articulation between 
philosophy, mass intellectuality and collective political organizations.  
 
One should stress the importance and significance which, in the modern world, political parties 
have in the elaboration and diffusion of conceptions of the world, because essentially what they do is to 
work out the ethics and the politics corresponding to these conceptions and act as it were as their 
historical “laboratory”. The parties recruit individuals out of the working mass, and the selection is 
made on practical and theoretical criteria at the same time. The relation between theory and practice 
becomes even closer the more the conception is vitally and radically innovatory and opposed to old 
ways of thinking. For this reason one can say that the parties are the elaborators of new integral and a l l  
encompassing intellectualities and the crucibles where the unification of theory and practice, 
understood as a real historical process, takes place (Q11, §12; SPN: 335)10. 
 
The relation of philosophy to hegemony is exemplified in Gramsci’s insistence 
that any relation of “hegemony” is also an “educational relation” (Q10II, §44; SPN, p. 
350). It is on the basis of this conception of the relation between philosophy and 
hegemony that Gramsci suggests the need for a different practice of philosophy leads to 
                                                                 
10 Translation altered. 
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the need for a new type of philosopher, the “democratic” philosopher, a type of 
philosopher that is itself the result of an historical process and a certain dialectic between 
theory and practice. 
 
The environment reacts back on the philosopher and imposes on him a continual process of 
self-criticism. It is his “teacher”. This is why one of the most important demands that the modern 
intelligentsias have made in the political field has been that of the so-called “freedom of thought and of 
the expression of thought” (“freedom of the press”, “freedom of association”). For the relationship 
between master and disciple in the general sense referred to above is only realised where this political 
condition exists, and only then do we get the “historical” realisation of a new type of philosopher, 
whom we could call a “democratic philosopher” in the sense that he is a philosopher convinced that his 
personality is not limited to himself as a physical individual but is an active social relationship of 
modification of the cultural environment (Q10II, §44; SPN: 350).  
 
The figure of the democratic philosopher suggests the need for a new form of 
intellectuals where exactly the important distinction has to do with their awareness of the 
limits of their subjectivity and the need for them to engage in collective political 
practices and knowledge practices that are the necessary conditions for their critical 
intellectual activity. This is a highly original conception of a non-subjective or post-
subjective condition of intellectuality. 
Therefore, it is obvious that Gramsci is treating philosophy of praxis  as an entire 
range of theoretical and discursive practices, dealing with social reality and the politics of 
social emancipation. It is a theoretical laboratory of alternative intellectualities. That is 
why philosophy of praxis is a creative activity. This complex articulation between 
philosophy, ideology and politics, including the use of a strategic concept such as the 
“historical bloc”, offers an insight into the depth of Gramsci’s confrontation with the 
historical and political modalities of theory. Gramsci’s “historicism” is exactly this 
apprehension of the historicity and political dynamics of theory, its actual effectivity in 
the politics of proletarian hegemony and communist emancipation. 
 
If the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the leaders and the led,  the 
rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion in which feeling-passion becomes 
understanding and thence knowledge (not mechanically but in a way that is alive), then and only then is 
the relationship one of representation. Only then can there take place an exchange of individual 
elements between the rulers and ruled, leaders [dirigenti] and led, and can the shared life be realised 
which alone is a social force with the creation of the “historical bloc” (Q11, §67, SPN: 418). 
 
 
3. Althusser’s struggle with the definition of philosophy 
 
An important aspect of Althusser’s theoretical endeavour has been his 
confrontation with the questions regarding the status of philosophy as a particular 
theoretical practice. This is evident in his different definitions of philosophy, from his 
first definition of – Marxist – philosophy as a potential Theory of theoretical practice to 
his later definitions of philosophy as political intervention and philosophy as class 
struggle in theory.  
7
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In Althusser’s initial move11, the specific status of philosophy as a Theory of 
theoretical practice was instrumental in his attempt to restore the scientific character of his 
conception of historical materialism. This was politically motivated and represented an 
important aspect of Althusser’s strategy of bringing about a change in the politics of the 
Communist movement. Althusser’s initial conception was that a correct theoretical 
starting point and knowledge of the balance of forces in the conjuncture can lead to the 
right political choices and a renewal of revolutionary strategy, then what was necessary 
was a Theory that would guarantee this scientificity. It was also important for this 
Theory not to be a construction or something added to Marx ’s theory, but something 
always existing in Marx’s own theoretical texts, marking a rather peculiar moment where 
a theoretical revolution carries along its own protocols of scientificity.  
However, there was the problem regarding the very notion of a science of 
sciences and a philosophy offering the protocols of scientificity. It is interesting that at  
same time Althusser was proposing a highly original epistemology that was in open 
rupture with traditional theories of knowledge. Althusser’s own conception of a science 
offering its own criteria of validity and his anti-empiricist emphasis on truth being an 
internal aspect of the text of science and not a question of empirical validation, 
precluded in advance any notion of protocols of truth. This is most evident in the 
introductory text of Reading Capital, in chronological terms the last one written, where 
the question of what are the criteria of the “knowledge-effect” is never answered. 
Although Althusser attempts to describe the difference in form between the knowledge-
effect and the ideology-effect, he does not offer any criteria that make possible the 
distinction or the judgment of the objectivity. That is why the text ends with the 
declaration of the inability to offer any theory of the guarantees of knowledge and, in this 
sense, of the inability of any potential Theory of theories. 
 
I shall leave the question in this last form, and merely recall its terms. Unlike the “theory of 
knowledge” of ideological philosophy, I am not trying to pronounce some de jure (or de facto) guarantee 
which will assure us that we really do know what we know, and that we can relate this harmony to a 
certain connexion between Subject and Object, Consciousness and the World12.  
 
Consequently, beginning with the 1966 text on the Philosophical conjuncture and 
Marxist Theoretical Research we begin to have a process of self-criticism regarding 
philosophy and its role. This change is evident in a series of texts by Althusser from fall 
1967 to early spring 1968, where we have a completely different definition of 
philosophy. These texts are Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists  and 
Lenin and Philosophy and the unpublished during Althusser’s lifetime Notes on philosophy. 
The main points of this process of theoretical self-criticism are the following. According 
to Althusser what “fundamentally distinguishes a philosophy from a science is the 
                                                                 
11 L. Althusser, For Marx, trans. by B. Brewster, London, Allen Lane/Penguin, 1969 and L. Althusser, 
É. Balibar, Reading Capital, cit. 
12 Ibid., p. 69. 
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organic, intimate, interior, constitutive relation it maintains with politics”13. Philosophy is 
related to scientific and theoretical breaks and ideological revolutions. Philosophy 
operates by ruptures, “philosophy is the ‘theory’ of ruptures”14. Philosophy is a form of 
intervention within a conjuncture, the conjuncture determined by epistemological breaks 
and ideological revolutions: it “is rupture as a thinking of this conjuncture”15. Every 
scientific discovery brings about a philosophical revolution and science precedes 
philosophy. Althusser also chooses another way to mark the difference between science 
and philosophy: the difference between production and practice. Science operates as a 
mode of production (a theoretical mode of production) whereas practices intervene in 
the concrete of the conjuncture, in terms of lines, strategies and forms of action. The 
notion of theoretical practice is presented as theoreticist, in contrast to scientific 
practice16.  
Philosophy and the spontaneous philosophy of the scientists is a crucial text with the 
introduction of the notion of philosophical theses that cannot be “true” but only “correct”  
[justes]17. This point is extremely important because Althusser acknowledges that 
philosophy is not a science and cannot claim some sort of “knowledge effect”. 
Philosophy is presented as a particular discourse “haunted by practice”18, that does not 
have a real object in the sense that sciences have. Consequently, there is a rather 
complex relation between science, ideology and philosophy: “philosophy is defined by a 
double relation – to the sciences and to practical ideologies”19. Philosophy does not 
produce knowledge or truth, but intervenes in this complex and necessarily 
contradictory terrain drawing a line of demarcation between the scientific and the 
ideological. The relation between science and ideology (practical ideologies) finds its 
expression in the emergence of spontaneous philosophies of the scientists. Therefore, 
philosophy becomes the particular terrain of the contradictory co-existence and 
interaction between science and ideology. Historical materialism offers a way for 
philosophy to have an apprehension of its functioning and of the role of practical 
ideologies. 
 
It has been seen that the philosophy to which we adhere – or, more exactly, the position we 
occupy in philosophy – is not unrelated to politics, to a certain politics, to Lenin’s politics, so much so 
that Lenin’s political formulae were of use to us in stating our theses on philosophy. There is no 
contradiction here: this politics is the politics of the workers ’ movement and its theory comes from 
Marx, just as the knowledge of practical ideologies that finally permits philosophy to control and criticize its organic l ink 
with practical ideology, and therefore to rectify the effects of this link by taking a “correct” line, comes from Marx20.  
                                                                 
13 L. Althusser, Écrits philosophiques et politiques, vol. 2, edited by F. Matheron, Paris, Stock/IMEC, 1995,  
p. 302. 
14 Ibid., p. 309. 
15 Ibid., p. 302. 
16 Ibid., p. 330. 
17 L. Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists , ed. by G. Elliot, London, Verso, 
1990, p. 74. 
18 Ibid., p. 75. 
19 Ibid., p. 83. 
20 Ibid., pp. 130-131. 
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In Lenin and Philosophy, Althusser attempts to articulate his new conception of 
philosophy as an intervention and as a constant redrawing of the line of demarcation 
between science and ideology (and between materialism and idealism). Philosophy is a 
very peculiar form of intervention that can be discerned only in its effects.  
 
For the intervention of each philosophy, which displaces or modifies existing philosophical 
categories and thus produces those changes in philosophical discourse in which the history of 
philosophy proffers its existence, is precisely the philosophical nothing whose insistence we have 
established, since a dividing-line actually is nothing, it is not even a line or a drawing, but the simple fact 
of being divided, i.e. the emptiness of a distance taken21.  
 
It is on the basis on this conception of philosophy as intervention that Althusser 
insists on the relation between philosophy and politics. 
 
Philosophy represents politics in the domain of theory, or to be more precise: with the sciences – 
and, vice versa, philosophy represents scientificity in politics, with the classes engaged in the class 
struggle. How this representation is governed, by what mechanisms this representation is assured, by 
what mechanisms it can be falsified or faked and is falsified as a general rule, Lenin does not tel l  us.  He is 
clearly profoundly convinced that in the last resort no philosophy can run ahead of this condition, 
evade the determinism of this double representation. In other words, he is convinced that philosophy 
exists somewhere as a third instance between the two major instances which constitute it as itself an 
instance: the class struggle and the sciences22.  
 
If philosophy is not a theoretical practice producing knowledge-effects, then 
Marxism, the first philosophy with an apprehension of its role, is not a new philosophy, 
nor a philosophical system, but a new practice of philosophy, a new way to intervene in 
philosophy: “What is new in Marxism’s contribution to philosophy is a new practice of 
philosophy. Marxism is not a (new) philosophy of praxis, but a (new) practice of philosophy”23. 
In his 1969 interview with M. A. Macciocchi, Althusser defines “dialectical 
materialism” as the philosophy that “represents the proletarian class struggle  in theory”24 
and in the Reply to John Lewis philosophy is defined as “in the last instance, class struggle 
in the field of theory”25. The reference to philosophy as in the last instance class struggle 
in theory is not an expression of the “summit of Althusserian dogmatism” 26, nor is it a 
simple reproduction of an over-politicized conception of theory under the  influence of 
Maoism and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, as has been suggested by Gregory Elliot 27. 
What is implied in this definition is that as a result of class struggle in society (and in 
ideology) every philosophical text – and consequently every “spontaneous philosophy of 
                                                                 
21 L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, trans. by B. Brewster, New York, Monthly Review 
Press, 1971, p. 62. 
22 Ibid., p. 65. 
23 Ibid., p. 68. 
24 Ibid., p. 19. 
25 L. Althusser, Elements in Self-criticism, trans. by G. Lock, London, New Left Books, 1976, p. 72. 
26 Y. Sintomer, “Présentation” in L. Althusser, Solitude de Machiavel et autres textes, Paris, PUF, 1998, p. 11. 
27 G. Elliot, Althusser. The Detour of theory, Leiden, Brill, 20062. 
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a scientist” – carries along a certain balance of forces between these basic antagonistic 
tendencies. 
 
In every “philosophy”, even when it represents as explicitly and “coherently” as possible one of 
the two great antagonistic tendencies, there exist manifest or latent elements of the other tendency.  And 
how could it be otherwise, if the role of every philosophy is to try to besiege the enemy ’s positions, 
therefore to interiorize the conflict in order to master it? Now this mastery  may escape precisely 
whoever is trying to establish it. For a simple reason: the fate of philosophical theses does not depend 
only on the position on which they stand – because the class struggle in theory is always secondary in 
relation to the class struggle in general, because there is something outside of philosophy which constitutes it as 
philosophy, even though philosophy itself certainly does not want to recognize the fact. 28  
 
 
4. Althusser and Gramsci: a missed encounter? 
 
Regarding the relation of Althusser to Gramsci29, on the one hand, we have 
Althusser’s positive remarks on Gramsci, referring to him as one of the few Marxists 
that had attempted a theory of the superstructures30 and citing him as an important 
influence in the development of the concept of Ideological State Apparatuses 31. On the 
other hand, early on Althusser launches an open attack on Gramsci in the “Marxism is 
not a historicism” section of Reading Capital, where he presents Gramsci as a proponent 
of a historicist conception of philosophy32. Therefore Gramsci was to be considered an 
important theoretician of the superstructures and of questions of state ideological 
apparatuses, but at the same time, his observations would be considered as lacking the 
necessary theoretical rigour and, at the same time, as being tainted with idealist and 
historicist elements. Althusser’s reference to “practical concepts”33 – as opposed to 
                                                                 
28 L. Althusser, Elements in Self-criticism, cit., pp. 144-145. 
29 For an overview of Althusser’s relation to Gramsci see V. Morfino, Althusser lecteur de Gramsci, “Actuel 
Marx”, 2015, n. 57, pp. 62-81. 
30 “[T]he theory of the specific effectivity of the superstructures and other ‘circumstances ‘ largely remains to be elaborated;  
and before the theory of their effectivity or simultaneously (for it is by formulating their effectivity that 
their essence can be attained) there must be elaboration of the theory of the particular essence of the specific 
elements of the superstructure. Like the map of Africa before the great explorations, this theory remains a 
realm sketched in outline, with its great mountain chains and rivers, but often unknown in detail 
beyond a few well-known regions. Who has really attempted to follow up the explorations of Marx and 
Engels? I can only think of Gramsci” (L. Althusser, For Marx, cit., pp. 113-114). 
31 “To my knowledge, Gramsci is the only one who went any distance in the road I am taking. He had 
the ‘remarkable’ idea that the State could not be reduced to the (Repressive) State Apparatus, but 
included, as he put it, a certain number of institutions from ‘civil society’: the Church, the Schools, the 
trade unions, etc. Unfortunately, Gramsci did not systematize his intuitions, which remained in the state 
of acute but fragmentary notes” (L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, cit., p. 142). 
32 L. Althusser, É. Balibar, Reading Capital, cit., pp. 119-144. In a letter to Franca Madonia dated July 2 
1965 (L. Althusser, Lettres à Franca (1961-1973), Paris, Stock/IMEC, 1997, pp. 623-624) Althusser is 
even more aggressive to Gramsci. He thinks that Gramsci’s writings have “profound weaknesses”, that 
Gramsci had never read Marx’s Capital, that he held the Catholic Church as the model for philosophy 
as world-view and that his theory of ideology is purely formal. 
33 L. Althusser, For Marx, cit., pp. 243-245. 
11
Sotiris: The Laboratory of Philosophy. Gramsci and Althusser on Philosophy
Published by OxyScholar, 2016
12 
proper theoretical concepts in the sense of what he termed Generalities III – helped this 
critical inclusion of certain Gramscian notions without excluding the necessary 
philosophical polemic34. Moreover, Gramsci’s conception of the emergence of the 
modern nation-state, as expressed in his reading of Machiavelli, was praised by 
Althusser35. However, in the second half of the 1970s Althusser became even more 
critical of Gramsci36. The target now was not Gramsci’s historicism but his conception 
of hegemony. As Vittorio Morfino has stressed, Althusser “[i]n 1965, [...] attacks 
historicism as a paradoxical [...] form of justification of Stalinism. In 1977-78 he attacks 
the concept of hegemony as the inspiring concept for Eurocommunism” 37. A whole 
section of his 1978 Marx in his Limits is devoted to criticism of Gramsci38. Althusser 
accuses Gramsci of over-generalizing the notion of hegemony, of underestimating the 
economic infrastructure, of downplaying the role of force, of tending towards an idealist 
conception of the state as educator. This criticism is over-determined by political 
considerations. Althusser’s interventions in the late 1970s were his last efforts to fight 
against what he perceived as a right-wing eurocommunist turn away from a 
revolutionary politics of smashing the State apparatus39. This critique was intensified in 
another unpublished text by Althusser from the same period, entitled Que faire?, in which 
Althusser accuses Gramsci’s concepts, such as the historical bloc or the passive 
revolution, as being tainted by an idealist and normative conception of the state and the 
different political forms40. 
However, the question remains. Why did Althusser choose such an open attack 
on Gramsci especially in Reading Capital, taking into consideration that other Marxist 
thinkers of “historicist” tendencies, such as Lukács and Korsch do not have the privilege 
of such an attack (even though History and Class Consciousness seems to be an “absent 
opponent” in many instances in Reading Capital)? I think that there are two reasons for 
this insistence. The first is actually Althusser’s interest in Gramsci, which is 
contemporary with his own attempt to theorize a break with idealism and economism 41. 
                                                                 
34 However, other members of the Althusserian School chose the road of silence regarding Gramsci. 
Balibar’s Cinque études du matérialisme historique (Paris, Maspero, 1974) contains only one single reference 
to Gramsci! 
35 Cf. V. Morfino, Althusser lecteur de Gramsci, cit., p. 72. 
36 Even though there were still positive appreciations such as the one found in his 1976 text on the 
Transformation of Philosophy (in L. Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientis ts ,  cit . ) or 
his positive references to Gramsci in Machiavelli and Us (L. Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, transl. by G. 
Elliot, London, Verso, 1999). 
37 V. Morfino, Althusser lecteur de Gramsci, cit., p. 81. 
38 L. Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter. Later Writings 1978-1987, trans. by G. M. Goshgarian, London,  
Verso, 2006, pp. 139-149. Aspects of this criticism can also be found in other texts of the same period.  
See for example his 1977 intervention on the Crisis of Marxism (L. Althusser, Solitude de Machiavel et 
autres textes, cit., pp. 267-280). 
39 For Althusser’s political and theoretical considerations of that period, see G.  M. Goshgarian, 
“Introduction” in Althusser, The philosophy of Encounter, cit. 
40 Cf. V. Morfino, Althusser lecteur de Gramsci, cit., pp. 77-81. 
41 See for example his insistence, in a 1962 Letter to Hélène Rytman, that new research in historical 
materialism must be “in the line of what Gramsci started doing” (L. Althusser, Lettres à Hélène, Paris, 
Grasset/IMEC, 2011, p. 411). 
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The second has to do with Althusser’s particular political and theoretical strategy in the 
early 1960s, which we discussed earlier. Althusser’s initial project was to induce a left-
wing correction of the political line of the communist movement, during a period of 
right-wing reformist de-Stalinization, through a theoretical turn towards a much more 
scientific version of Marxism. The scientific character of this redefined Marxism would 
guarantee, in its fusion with political leadership, the making of correct political decisions. 
Gramsci posed a very important challenge to Althusser’s attempt to theorize a potential 
Theory of theoretical practice that could act as a guarantee of scientificity. While 
Gramsci did not support a typical historicist – metaphysical conception of a messianic 
Subject of history, or an all-encompassing substance at the centre of historical dialectics, 
which seemed to be the main targets of Althusser’s attack on Hegelian Marxism, he did 
insist on Marxism being not a science in the positivist sense of the term. Instead, he 
insisted – especially in his polemic against Bukharin – on the need for a different 
theoretical modality for historical materialism. This was expressed in his call for a 
philosophy of praxis. As Peter Thomas correctly points out: 
 
The philosophy of praxis therefore insists upon its necessarily partial and incomplete nature,  as 
the theoretical expression of an historical subjectivity that wants to help create the conditions of a 
genuinely human objectivity, that is, a “universal subjectivity”. Its truth, in other words, is located in the 
world rather than transcending it. As a mode of knowing the world from within it, “immanently”, it 
challenges both the metaphysical materialism of Bukharin and the idealist traditions of Western 
Philosophy by offering a radically alternative conception of the relation between thought and Being42.  
 
This was something that Althusser obviously thought that it posed a very 
important challenge to his strategy of a scientific correction of a political line. In 
addition, Althusser was highly sceptical of any attempt to historicize both social reality 
and the concepts used to theorize it, despite his insistence on the co -existence of 
different historical times and their specific structures of historicity43, which, at least in my 
opinion, opens the way for a highly original conception of historicity. Here Althusser’s 
negative position is also over-determined by his identification of any reference to 
historicity with a historicist conflation of real history and theory and with a humanist 
vision of human actors as the authors of their destiny44. At the same time, the extent of 
                                                                 
42 P. D. Thomas, The Gramscian Moment. Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism, cit., p. 306. 
43 “[I]t is only possible to give a content to the concept of historical time by defining historical time as 
the specific form of existence of the social totality under consideration, an existence in which different 
structural levels of temporality interfere, because of the peculiar relations of correspondence, non-
correspondence, articulation, dislocation and torsion which obtain, between the different ‘levels’ of the 
whole in accordance with its general structure. It needs to be said that, just as there is no production in 
general, there is no history in general, but only specific structures of historicity, based in the last resort 
on the specific structures of the different modes of production, specific structures of historicity which,  
since they are merely the existence of determinate social formations (arising from specific modes of 
production), articulated as social wholes, have no meaning except as a function of the essence of those 
totalities, i.e., of the essence of their peculiar complexity” (L. Althusser, É. Balibar, Reading Capital,  cit .,  
pp. 108-109). 
44 “It must be said that the union of humanism and historicism represents the gravest temptation, for i t  
procures the greatest theoretical advantages, at least in appearance. In the reduction of all knowledge to 
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Althusser’s continuous confrontation and constant return to the dialogue with Gramsci, 
indeed suggests that “an important key for the reading of his position can be found in 
his continuous work on Gramsci”45. 
 
 
5. How can everyone be a philosopher? 
 
In light of the above, it is important to return to some of Althusser’s elaborations 
on the question of philosophy in the 1970s. The recent publication of Althusser’s 
Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes offers important insights to Althusser’s 
attempt to redefine philosophy and at the same time offers a conception of philosophy 
as a conceptual laboratory that is indeed close to Gramsci’s conception. 
The Initiation belongs, along with texts such as Machiavelli and Us, to Althusser’s 
completed manuscripts that he decided not to publish. Thematically it is close to the 
1976 lecture on the Transformation of Philosophy, delivered at the University of Granada, a 
text that coincides with the preparation of the Initiation.  
For Althusser the perpetual struggle between idealism and materialism is not a 
fight between two different philosophies; it is a struggle between two “contradictory 
practices of philosophy”46. These two different practices of philosophy are not symmetrical. 
One refers to the practice of teaching idealist philosophy by specialized professors of 
philosophy. In contrast, materialist philosophers “(like Diderot, Lenin, Gramsci)”  insist 
that “everyone is a philosopher”47. It is interesting that Althusser uses here a well known 
phrase from Gramsci, from a passage from the Prison Notebooks that has been the target 
of Althusser’s critique of historicism in Reading Capital48. For Althusser this natural 
philosophy of ordinary people, includes knowledge and ideas and has both a practical 
and theoretical aspect, that according to him had already been highlighted by Gramsci. 
However, Althusser thinks that this “natural” philosophy can be paradoxical and 
contradictory. Unless it is “educated” by political struggles, it can be “profoundly passive  
and conformist”49, a philosophy of resignation and defeat. Above all, idealist philosophy 
inherits the preoccupation with the question of the Origin of the World. One of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
the historical social relations a second underhand reduction can be introduced, by treating the relations of 
production as mere human relations. This second reduction depends on something ‘obvious’: is not history 
a ‘human’ phenomenon through and through, and did not Marx, quoting Vico, declare that men can, 
know it since they have ‘made’ all of it? But this ‘obviousness’ depends on a remarkable presupposit ion:  
that the ‘actors’ of history are the authors of its text, the subjects of its production. But this 
presupposition too has all the force of the ‘obvious’, since, as opposed to what the theatre suggests, 
concrete men are, in history, the actors of roles of which they are the authors, too. Once the stage-
director has been spirited away, the actor-author becomes the twin-brother of Aristotle’s old dream: the 
doctor-who-cures-himself” (Ibid., p. 139). 
45 V. Morfino, Althusser lecteur de Gramsci, cit., p. 81. 
46 L. Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes, ed. by G. M. Goshgarian, Paris, PUF, 2014,  
p. 51. 
47 Ibid., p. 52; see Q8, §204; PN III: 352. 
48 L. Althusser, É. Balibar, Reading Capital, cit., p. 128. 
49 L. Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes, cit., p. 56. 
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main achievements of materialist philosophy is to prove that questioning why there is 
something instead of nothing is exactly the kind of “questions that have no sense at all”50. In 
contrast, a materialist philosophy like Epicurus’ does not pose the question of origins 
but the question of the beginning. The materialist thesis is that “[t]here is [...] always already 
something, always already matter exists”51, and Althusser points to the direction of the 
Epicurean theme of the rain of atoms falling that encounter each other after a deviation, 
which would later be a cornerstone of the imagery of aleatory materialism in the post-
1980 works. 
For Althusser, a materialist philosophy is another tradition within philosophy, a 
tradition that “rejects the questions that have no sense”52. Although Althusser insists on the 
spontaneous philosophy of the people being one of resignation, associated with religion, 
he insists that also we can find in it another conception that appeals people “at work, at 
the transformation of nature, and at a laborious research of some truth on the world ”53. It is exactly 
this effort, in most parts collective, to transform the world and act upon it that inscribes 
the “conviction that there are reasons at things, and reasons that people can understand 
and master, since man arrives at producing definite results by respecting the laws of their 
production, that are the laws of nature and society. Production and action are also the 
proof of the truth of these laws”54. This produces a “philosophy of work and struggle, an active 
philosophy”55. Consequently, this materialist philosophy is a “philosophy of practice” in 
contrast to idealism as a “philosophy of theory”56. 
Althusser then makes a grand detour, not in philosophy, but towards non-philosophy, 
towards the outside of philosophy, a potential “History of the non-philosophy” , that would 
take account of the materiality of concrete social practices and antagonisms outside 
philosophy, that had been “neglected, rejected, censored, abandoned”57 by idealist philosophy. 
Materialism is presented as a detour not simply through other philosophers or through 
the sciences, but as a detour through the very materiality of labour, exploitation, class 
struggle, sexual difference, madness, state power. 
Abstraction is what links philosophy to the materiality of practices. Abstraction is 
not about abandoning the concrete terms of our existence or about talking about non 
existing things: “every specific practice (labour, scientific research, medicine, political 
struggle) abstracts from the rest of reality in order to concentrate at the transformation of a part of 
reality”58. For Althusser there is a certain “dialectic”59 between the abstract and the 
concrete. There is a “real concrete” in our lives, namely “what we make ourselves”60. 
However, these concrete practices cannot be understood without some reference to 
                                                                 
50 Ibid., p. 64. 
51 Ibid., p. 66. 
52 Ibid., p. 71. 
53 Ibid., p. 82. 
54 Ibid., p. 84. 
55 Ibid., p. 85. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., p. 100. 
58 Ibid., p. 105. 
59 Ibid., p. 116. 
60 Ibid., p. 117. 
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ideological relations that make people repeat the same “gestures fixed in advance”61, 
either in labour, or in the “ceremony of love”62. Abstraction represents exactly this 
tendency for the reproduction of practices that determine the concrete human practices. 
This relational aspect links the abstract and the concrete. The abstract is in reality not 
something that is separated from the concrete but something that adds to the concrete a 
certain aspect of generality, or of repetition. Scientific practice does not only add an 
element of abstraction and generality, like practical-technical knowledge; its abstraction 
points towards not “generality, but universality”63. Science is not limited to particular cases 
and the “concrete of science is the experimental concrete, the ‘purified’ concrete that is 
defined and produced in relation to a problem that has been posed”64. Therefore its 
concrete character is not primary, but it is produced as a result of the theoretical 
operations of an experimental dispositif. Therefore we have a “concrete – abstract – concrete”  
cycle or a “practice – theory – practice”65.  
Turning to philosophical abstraction, Althusser stresses the tendency of idealist 
philosophy to think about everything that exists and everything that is possible to exist; 
philosophy has to do not with generality but with totality. Philosophical abstractions are 
not “universalizing” but “totalising”66 and in contrast to science, which “always ends up 
in front of its finite object”, philosophy ends up facing “its infinite project”67. Althusser 
links this totalizing character of philosophical abstraction to the functioning of dominant 
ideologies. Consequently, philosophy deals, in reality, less with the knowledge of existing 
and possible beings, but “the conflicts they are the stake of”, making every philosophy 
“haunted by its contrary [...] idealism is haunted by materialism just as materialism is 
haunted by idealism”68. The particularity of philosophical abstractions is that they are 
active, polemical, and divisive, referring not only to “objects” but to “positions” that 
have to be affirmed in their very contradictory co-existence with opposite positions. It 
also brings forward an image of philosophy constantly trying to master conflictual 
tendencies that come from outside, from the materiality of social practices, of class 
struggles and of ideological formations, which determine philosophy and which 
philosophy is obliged constantly to interiorize. Philosophical abstraction becomes the 
site and the form of this interiorized conflict. This relation of idealist philosophies to 
science and social practices can be in certain cases positive and progressive , as was the 
case with bourgeois idealist philosophy during the period of the ascendancy of the 
bourgeoisie. However, after the end of the bourgeois revolutionary era, the attempt of 
positivist or logical-positivist philosophy to offer guaranties to science, is also an attempt 
to “control” people working in science in the name of a certain “idea of Order”69, that 
                                                                 
61 Ibid., p. 118. 
62 Ibid., p. 119. 
63 Ibid., p. 134. 
64 Ibid., p. 135. 
65 Ibid., p. 136. 
66 Ibid., p. 144. 
67 Ibid., p. 145. 
68 Ibid., p. 158. 
69 Ibid., p. 198. 
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comes from the “class struggle of a bourgeoisie forced [...] to impose its Order, because it is 
contested by workers, in the name of a philosophy that guarantees that we need an 
Order and that the bourgeois Order is the real one”70. 
In contrast, the materialist element in scientific practice is based in the fact that  is 
dominated by the process itself, by the confrontation with the materiality of the object 
of knowledge and of the experimental apparatus. 
 
[The researcher] is an agent in a process that surpasses him and is not its subject, namely the 
origin or the creator. The process of the practice, namely scientific production is therefore a “process 
without a subject” [...] it is subjected to objective laws that also determine the nature and the role of the 
agent, the scientific researcher71.  
 
A complex ensemble of relations, both relations of existing theory and technique 
and philosophical and ideological relations dominates processes of scientific production . 
This constant struggle, linked “in the last instance, to class struggle”, implies that there is 
a part of philosophy that “serves the interests of science and another that exploits them 
in favour of the dominant ideology”72. Only a handful of scientists realize this particular 
efficacy of philosophy, “by the instinct of their practice”, “Materialist philosophers” and 
Marxist militants “by the theory of historical materialism”73. 
Regarding political practice Althusser contrasts the bourgeois and proletarian 
practices. In contrast to the “political ideas of the bourgeoisie” which are “ideas for others” 
proletarian ideas “born from the struggle, cannot avoid being translated into actions, [...] 
pass into action”74. Political practice is also about abstractions, because “ it exists under 
the absolute condition of relations (economical, political, ideological)”75 and because 
“under these social relations, it produces abstractions itself, above all practical and then 
abstract and theoretical, that modify its proper terrain of action and verification”76. 
Finally, these abstractions “encounter” a science, namely historical materialism, 
“constituted by intellectuals” but based upon the “theoretical (philosophical) positions 
of the proletarian class”77. For Althusser, in the last analysis, political practice is a 
practice that concerns “the process itself”78. Consequently, political practice is closer to the 
Aristotelian definition of praxis than of poiesis79, since it has more to do with a process 
where the agents involved are transforming themselves. Here Althusser seems to 
endorse a certain version of Marx’s reference to “revolutionäre Praxis” in the Theses of 
Feuerbach: 
 
                                                                 
70 Ibid., p. 199. 
71 Ibid., p. 207. 
72 Ibid., p. 219. 
73 Ibid., p. 220. 
74 Ibid., p. 276. 
75 Ibid., p. 282. 
76 Ibid., pp. 282-283. 
77 Ibid., p. 283. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., p. 284. 
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[Proletarian political practice] realizes the unity and transformation of the objective situation and the 
transformation of itself. Marx has given the first formulations of this identity in the Theses on Feuerbach, 
where he talks about the revolutionary “praxis” like the identity of the transformation of the object (the 
relation of forces) and of the subject (the organized revolutionary class). In this case what substitutes 
exteriority in the bourgeois political practice, between those that lead and those that act, between ideas 
and action, would disappear in favour of a dialectic of mutual unification and transformation between 
the objective situation and the revolutionary forces that are engaged in this battle. [. ..] It is this new 
relation, this new concrete abstraction that gives the full sense to the Marxist -materialist position on the 
primacy of practice over theory80. 
 
Psychoanalytic practice, in its turn, represents for Althusser an attempt to put an 
end to “the bourgeois idealist representation of man as [...] sensible, juridical, moral, 
political, religious, philosophical subject, as a transparent being, ‘without a behind’”81. 
For Althusser, in a line similar to some of the observations made in the “Discovery of 
Dr. Freud” (the text of the infamous “Tbilisi Affair”) insists that psychoanalysis, even in 
its Lacanian version, is not a proper science. It is still in a pre-scientific state. 
Regarding artistic practice Althusser begins by a reference to the inutility82of the 
work of art as a social object, that is similar to a Kantian “purposiveness without 
purpose”. Artistic pleasure, as the result of a social process that attributes to objects of 
art their beauty and inutility, is the product of “a new form of abstraction”, that presents 
itself as a “concrete object”83. Althusser insists on this dimension of artistic pleasure 
referring both to Aristotelian catharsis and Freud ’s reference to art as realization of a 
desire. Both the production and the consumption of artistic objects is subject to the 
ideological class struggle: “aesthetic practice, far from being an act that purely creates 
beauty, takes place under abstract social relations, which are not only the norms that define 
beauty but also the ideological relations of the class struggle”84. Althusser attempts to 
recapitulate his definition of the importance of abstractions in all social practices. What 
Althusser defines as abstractions has to do exactly with the relational character of social 
reality, the importance of the constant efficacy of social relations and consequently of 
class struggle. That is why he insists that there is no abstraction in general, although there 
are general abstractions. For Althusser abstraction refers exactly to social relations that 
are “rooted in the materiality of social practices”, and are abstract “in the sense that they permit 
the final production of the concrete”85. These abstract relations exist only to the extent that 
they are rooted in concrete practices. It is this contradictory articulation of concrete 
practices and abstract relations, traversed by the constant efficacy of class struggles that 
produces what we tend to define as human history. 
For Althusser this entire detour regarding all forms of practices (and the relations 
that determine the relevant abstractions) aims at defining the object that philosophy 
transforms, namely the ideologies related to these social practices: “what philosophical 
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practice transforms, are the ideologies under which different social practices produce their proper effects”86. 
Althusser insists on the “performative” character of philosophical propositions with a 
direct reference to Austin’s theory of speech acts87 and he offers as an example the 
functioning of Descartes’ declaration that God exists, which for Althusser “opens the 
world”88 of Descartes idealist philosophy, although in reality it offers no objective 
knowledge. Althusser insists on the position, first introduced in the 1967-68 texts that 
philosophy “does not produce the knowledge of real object, but it posits Theses”89. In this sense 
philosophy “has no object (in the sense that scientific practice and productive practice 
have an object), but it has something else in view: objectives or stakes”90. Philosophical 
theses are “abstract terms” but should be viewed as “categories” instead of scientific 
concepts91. Philosophical objects, although purely “internal to philosophy” and “not 
real” are “a means to occupy some terrain over a philosophical adversary”92. The aim of 
philosophical interventions is “strategic and tactical war against the theoretical forces of 
the adversary, which, as in every war, comprises stakes”93. However, there is a something 
specific in the philosophical Kampfplatz: philosophy is by nature contradictory, there is 
always question of which tendency prevails, the materialist or the idealist. Moreover, in 
every philosophy one can find both tendencies in their contradiction: “in every philosophy 
what is realized is not the tendency but the contradictions between the two tendencies”94. It is in the 
nature of the philosophical warfare to always attempt to enter the “enemy’s territory”, to 
“occupy the adversary’s positions”95. The specificity of philosophical battles is that 
although they refer to real stakes, in the sciences or in other social practices, at the same 
time these stakes do not appear “in person” in the terrain of philosophy. In a certain 
way, philosophy attempts to answer the major ideological repercussions caused by 
scientific discoveries. Consequently, Althusser’s provisional conclusion is that 
philosophy plays an important role to the whole process of the unification of “existing 
ideological elements into dominant ideology”96.  
For Althusser philosophy is a “theoretical laboratory”97, and he talks about 
philosophy and philosophers as “fitter machinists [ajusteurs]”98 in order to describe the 
role philosophy plays in unifying diverse ideological elements into a dominant ideology. 
This role that in the past was mainly played by religion, but now because of the 
emergence of scientific knowledge and the “materialist menace” it brings to “established 
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powers”99, this role falls upon philosophy. In order to accomplish this task philosophy 
had to incorporate certain elements of scientific discourse, such as the logical vigour of 
mathematics, in order to make them serve the dominant ideologies. “Domesticate its 
adversary by stealing its language: here is the secret of ideological struggle, even when this 
takes, for given historical reasons, the form of ideological struggle”100. This reaction of 
philosophy does not coincide with the event. Sometimes this reaction comes with a 
certain delay, the time needed “to pass from an economic revolution, to revolution in 
politics, and then in ideology”101. Sometimes it can come before the event and Althusser 
refers to the long process of the transition to the dominance of capitalist relations of 
production, a large part of which took place before the full emergence of new forms of 
the bourgeois State, although bourgeois ideology was effective during all this process. 
Consequently, philosophy has to take the form of a theory which includes existing forms 
of scientific demonstration, in order to “participate”102 in this process of ideological 
unification which is not limited to philosophy. Philosophy as a “theoretical fitter 
machinist” may even find itself in need of a “production line of polyvalent pieces” which 
can be used in all cases where such an “ideological fitting [raccord idéologique]”103 has to be 
imposed. Moreover, the “the work of the fitter-philosopher consists in forging categories 
that are as universal as possible, capable of unifying under their theses the different domains of ideology” . 
Consequently, philosophy imposes its “theoretical power” not only upon actually 
existing objects but also upon the “ensemble of ideologies” in order to overcome “the 
contradictions existing in every ideology, in order to unify this ideology into a domina nt 
ideology”104.  
This function of philosophy in the ideological class struggle can explain the 
traditional form of the philosophical system. “The system is thus the verification of the 
existence of unity, produced by unification, a unity exhibited and demonstrated by its 
proper exhibition, the visible proof that philosophy has well embraced and mastered the 
‘whole’ and that there is nothing that exists and does not fall under its jurisdiction ”105 In 
contrast, philosophers that have refused this kind of systemic form, such as Kierkegaard 
or Nietzsche in reality waged in the “paradoxical form” of their philosophy a sort of 
“philosophical dispositive of guerrilla warfare [...] attacking [...] by surprise, by 
aphorisms, in an attempt to dismember the enemy front”106. 
For Althusser all past philosophies were subjected to this mechanism, namely the 
reproduction and unification of dominant ideologies, they were dependent upon their 
class “subjectivity”107 The question that arises is how to make sure that “philosophy is not 
the theoretical delirium of an individual, or a social class in its quest for guaranties and 
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rhetorical ornaments”108. Philosophies that attempt to help the unification of dominant 
ideologies are affected by the “dynamics of class exploitation”109. The important 
difference of a potential materialist philosophy related to the political ideology of the 
proletariat is exactly the special relation to a historical materialist scientific knowledge of 
the ideology. “It is this scientific knowledge of the ideology commanding the philosophy charged with 
unifying proletarian ideology that will enable the conditions of a philosophical adjustment as objective as 
possible”110. This particular form of adjustment is linked to “Marxist category of 
correctness”111.  
Idealist philosophy, when it takes the form of a system, in order to help the 
unification of diverse ideological elements is “reproducing within itself the form of the 
State: its unity, more powerful than any diversity”112. If a strategy for communism 
requires a new practice of politics, it also requires a new practice of philosophy, not 
another philosophical system, a practice of philosophy in sharp break to the State.  
 
It is always the strategy of communism that is in operation in these perspectives, both 
philosophical and political. It is about preparing now for a revolutionary and communist future; it is 
about putting in place, now, entirely new elements, without ceding to the pressure of bourgeois 
ideology and philosophy; in contrast it is about resisting them. And as it is the question of the State that 
commands all, it is important to break, now, the subtle but very strong link that links the State to 
philosophy, in particular under the form of the “system”113. 
 
This means that there can be another emancipatory relation between philosophy 
and social practices and in particular the political practices of the proletariat. “We can 
envisage an entirely different [un tout autre] relation of philosophy to ideologies and to practices in the 
revolutionary perspective of Marxism: no longer a relation of servitude and exploitation, but a relation of 
liberation and liberty”114. 
The problem is that the question of such a new practice of philosophy in the 
history of Marxism has been seen as the question of a new philosophy, either in the 
form of a philosophy that could “absorb [...] the science of history”, a position he 
attributes to young Hegel, to Labriola, to Gramsci, but also to Stalin that “made out of 
philosophy a science that includes in the Marxist theory of history”115. The problem, 
according to Althusser, was that all these attempts at thinking about Marxist philosophy 
were still inspired by the existing model of bourgeois philosophy, defined in the form of 
a “system” or a “theory”, and he self-critically admits that he made the same mistake 
when in his earlier texts he presented philosophy “after the model of science”116. A new 
philosophy cannot take the form of an epistemological break, it is “not marked by this 
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discontinuity”117. Even a philosophy that aims at representing “the worldview of a 
revolutionary class in philosophy” will have to intervene in the same philosophical 
terrain of struggle, even when it chooses to refuse traditional rules of combat, such as 
the reference to a “system” and to impose its own. This makes necessary a “new Marxist 
practice of philosophy”118. It is interesting that he still feels the need to again repeat his 
respectful but critical position regarding Gramsci’s conception of a “philosophy of 
praxis”. It is as if he realizes that Gramsci is his main intellectual interlocutor regarding 
the question of this new practice of philosophy. 
 
I wouldn’t talk about, as Gramsci does, perhaps constrained by the prison guard censorship, 
about Marxism as a “philosophy of praxis”: not that consider the idea of praxis (transformation of the 
self by the self) as a displaced within Marxism, on the contrary, but because this formulation can enter a  
discussion with the old idealist form of the “philosophy of” which defines in essence or in “sense” 
from the ensemble of things a particular determination, here of “praxis”. In order to say my whole 
thinking, such a formulation can lead to an idealist interpretation of the position of Marx in 
philosophy119. 
 
Therefore, the task of new practice of philosophy that would serve as an “arm of 
the revolution” is difficult. On the one hand, it has to affirm constantly “the primacy of 
practice over theory”, but, at the same time, it must be something more than a simple 
“servant of [proletarian] politics”120. Rather it is 
 
an original form of existence of theory, entirely turned towards practice, and which can possess 
a true autonomy, if its relation to political practice is constantly controlled by knowledges produced by  
Marxist science of the law of class struggle and its effects. The most extraordinary, without doubt, of 
this conception is the profound unity that inspired all its determinations, at the same time liberating the 
practices that are the stake of its struggle of all forms of exploitation and oppression by bourgeois 
ideology and philosophy121. 
 
Althusser insists on a certain positive and liberating role philosophy as a relatively 
autonomous theoretical intervention can play regarding social practices and their 
emancipation from the constraints imposed by bourgeois ideology and its philosophical 
forms. This particular relation to social practice also implies that Marxist philosophers 
cannot live isolated from social reality and struggle. In contrast, a Marxist philosopher is 
“a theoretician that behaves as a militant, not only in philosophy, but also in political 
practice”122.  
In the final pages Althusser returns to the question he posed at the beginning of 
the manuscript, namely whether every man is a philosopher. For Althusser we can say 
that every man is “virtually a philosopher”123 in the sense that he could have conscience 
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of philosophical question in a spontaneous way in social life. However, philosophy 
requires also the study of works of philosophy, but above all a certain practice of 
philosophy, “we must learn philosophy in practice, in the different practices, and above 
all in the practice of class struggle”124. Consequently, one can become a philosopher, but 
this apprenticeship in philosophy requires that one has a theoretical formation both in 
terms of theory and scientific practice but also of political practice and class struggle. 
This combined philosophical education by both theory and militant practice, in reality 
renders a completely different modality, both theoretical and political, to a materialist 
practice of philosophy in the service of the proletariat, at the same time offering the only 
possible way to revitalize philosophy as such facing the very decline of bourgeois 
philosophy in a time of capitalist technocracy as an aspect of the crisis of the 
bourgeoisie’s ability to offer a hegemonic narrative: 
 
If we ask ourselves: finally what is a philosopher? I would say: he is a man that struggles in theory. 
And in order to struggle, he has to learn to struggle by fighting, and to struggle in theory he has to 
become a theoretician by scientific practice and by the practice of political and ideological struggle.  
In a time that the bourgeoisie has renounced producing even its eternal philosophical systems, 
at a time that it has renounced the guarantee and the perspective of ideas in order to entrust its destiny 
to the automatism of computers and technocrats, at a time when it is incapable of proposing to the 
world a thinkable and possible future, the proletariat can take up the challenge: give life to philosophy 
and in order to liberate people from class domination, make philosophy “an arm of the revolution”125.  
 
Althusser insists on the possibility of philosophy becoming vital again only 
through the development of a radically different practice of philosophy and a new figur e 
of the philosopher, this “militant theoretician”, trained both in theory and in class 
struggle. In particular this emphasis on an active relation to social practices and militancy 
is, in a certain yet distant way, close to Gramsci’s conception of the “democratic 
philosopher”, that we discussed earlier.  
All these attest to the importance of the Initiation. Althusser stresses the 
importance of practices and relations and consequently abstractions in all aspects of 
social life. This is not only an important contribution to a relational conception of social 
practices; it is also a way to rethink the way philosophical reflection is linked to the 
ideology and social practice, by means of a reference to the broader relation between 
practices and ideology. In all aspects of social life, we encounter particular pract ices and 
consequently relations. This also means that we encounter ideology, or to be more 
precise, ideologies. Dominant ideologies attempt to impose a certain “unity” of social 
practices, a certain “unification” of practices that are contradictory, antagonistic and 
traversed with struggles. Philosophy emerges exactly as part of this process of forced 
unification. Therefore, Althusser’s conception offers the possibility to rethink both the 
role of idealist philosophy in forging and establishing forms of ideological and political 
domination, and the possibility of a materialist practice of philosophy aiming not only at 
defending the materialist potential of the sciences (their “scientificity”) but also at 
liberating the collective social and political practices of the subaltern classes. If 
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philosophy is the theoretical laboratory of forms of hegemony of the dominant classes, a 
materialist practice of philosophy can also help the collective elaboration of forms of 
counter-hegemony. It performs this task not in the form of revolutionary “philosophical 
systems” and not only in the sense of a response to the constant re-emergence and 
reproduction of idealist tendencies. Above all, it enables practices of collective critical 
intellectuality, of facilitating new forms of collective elaboration of theories and political 
practices, of helping the establishment of new vocabularies and metaphors, in the service 
of social emancipation. 
The 1976 lecture on the Transformation of Philosophy elaborates more on this theme 
of – idealist – philosophy as an attempt to impose a certain conceptual violence in the 
sense of imposing a certain Truth that is an aspect of an attempt towards Hegemony. 
 
In both cases it is a question of reorganizing, dismembering, recomposing and unifying, 
according to a precise orientation, a whole series of social practices and their corresponding ideologies,  
in order to make sovereign, over all the subordinate elements, a particular Truth that imposes on them 
a particular orientation, guaranteeing this orientation with that Truth. If the correspondence is exact, we 
may infer that philosophy, which continues the class struggle as befits it, in theory, responds to a 
fundamental political necessity. The task which it is assigned and delegated by the class struggle in 
general, and more directly by the ideological class struggle, is that of contributing to the unification of 
the ideologies within a dominant ideology and of guaranteeing this dominant ideology as Truth. [...] In 
short, philosophy produces theoretical schemas, theoretical figures that serve as mediators for 
surmounting contradictions and as links for reconnecting the different elements of ideology. Moreover,  
it guarantees (by dominating the social practices thus reordered) the Truth of this order, enunciated in 
the form of the guarantee of a rational discourse126.  
 
In contrast, a new practice of philosophy can only be a non-philosophy at 
undermining and deconstructing traditional philosophical systems and philosophical 
idealism in general and thus opening up the way for emancipatory and transformative 
social and political practices. 
 
To support our argument by comparison with the revolutionary State, which ought to be a State 
that is a “non-State” – that is, a State tending to its own dissolution, to be replaced by forms of free 
association – one might equally say that the philosophy which obsessed Marx, Lenin and Gramsci 
ought to be a “non-philosophy” – that is, one which ceases to be produced in the form of a 
philosophy, whose function of theoretical hegemony will disappear in order to make way for new 
forms of philosophical existence. And just as the free association of workers ought, according to Marx,  
to replace the State so as to play a totally different role from that of the State (not one of v iolence and 
repression), so it can be said that the new forms of philosophical existence linked to the future of these 
free associations will cease to have as their essential function the constitution of the dominant ideology,  
with all the compromises and exploitation that accompany it, in order to promote the liberation and 
free exercise of social practices and human ideas127.  
 
The Initiation offers the way to rethink exactly this possibility of a liberating role 
for a different materialist practice of philosophy. The main role of such a practice is not 
to systematize and elaborate, as is the case with traditional philosophy, but to liberate, to 
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emancipate, to emancipate social practices. If proletarian political practice aims at 
liberating collective practices of transformation from the coercive constraints of 
bourgeois politics and the State, a materialist practice of philosophy, aligned to the 
working class movement, aims also at liberating collective practices, of resistance, 
transformation and creativity, from the forced ideological unification, imposed by 
dominant ideology. This in its turn is directly related to the conception Althusser had 
about communism being not a “project” or an “ideal”, but a process of collective 
resistance and experimentation with alternative social configuration. Althusser insisted 
on communism emerging at the margins of capitalism, in practices and resistances that 
oppose the commodity form, in virtual forms of communism existing in the interstices of 
capitalist social forms. 
 
Marx thinks of communism as a tendency of capitalist society. This tendency is not an abstract 
result. It already exists, in a concrete form in the “interstices of capitalist society” (a little bit like 
commodity relations existing “in the interstices” of slave or feudal society), virtual forms of 
communism, in the associations that manage [...] to avoid commodity relations128.  
 
Therefore we might say that the role of a different materialist practice of 
philosophy is exactly this liberation of relations, practices and imaginaries coming from 
the terrain of the autonomous class struggles of the working classes, their resistances, 
their collective experimentations, in an attempt to bring them from the “margins” to the 
centre of social life. 
Dominique Lecourt also tried to offer such a reading of an alternative materialist 
practice of philosophy. The epilogue to his 1981 critique of logical positivism, L’ordre et 
les jeux129 titled “For a philosophy without feint. Towards a sur-materialism” follows 
exactly such a conception of a practice of philosophy and was then further expanded in 
the 1982 La philosophie sans feinte130. Beginning with a reading of Wittgenstein ’s 
Philosophical Investigations Lecourt insists on the need to “transform profoundly the very 
notion of ‘materialism’”131. For Lecourt we must be in opposition to “every philosophy 
of ‘unification’, of cement” because it is “a language game” that has the effect of 
balancing and absorbing differences. Therefore “another practice of philosophy”132 aims 
at helping the emergence of differences within social practices and cannot be a “theory”  
or a “doctrine”: “Rather, it will be an ‘anti-machine’ which by practicing philosophy in a 
radically dissymmetrical mode, will systematically dismantle the gears of the former 
[idealist philosophy]”133. 
Lecourt chooses to describe this philosophy as a “sur-materialism”, in a play of 
words following Bachelard’s “sur-rationalism”. He is highly critical of references to 
“dialectical” materialism insisting that “materialist” positions are also “dialectical” in 
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exactly the sense of a refusal of “ontology”134. In the La philosophie sans feinte Lecourt 
elaborates on this point. In a line similar to Althusser, he insists that lived experience is 
determined by abstraction, the first abstraction being language. Moreover, the emergence 
of dominant ideologies, implies a mechanism by means of which “local” ideologies or 
“microideologies”, which by themselves are “anchored” to particular social practices, are 
reabsorbed and unified. Philosophy and its “language machine” attempts to give “to this 
unification a systematic and total form”135. Therefore we need to “practice [philosophy] 
without feint”136. This is necessary especially if we take into consideration the efficacy of 
philosophical abstraction once they have been inscribed into ideological representations 
and language games.  
 
Surely, philosophy will never stop being “abstract”, but it will be answering the exigency of 
those that reproach it [...] by putting in movement, by means of a play of displacements, the 
abstractions in their concrete existence, it could contribute to the concrete deployment of social 
practices, without being an obstacle to them137. 
 
 
6. Philosophy as a challenge for Marxism 
 
How are we going to conceive this new practice of philosophy that promotes “the 
liberation and free exercise of social practices”? Is it simply an attempt to deconstruct 
and subvert idealist tendencies and bring forward the radical and materialist element in 
theoretical practices, as constant bending of the stick to the opposite side, an attempt to 
intervene and change the theoretical and in the last instance political balance of forces, 
as Althusser has suggested? Or is a much more positive attempt to rethink philosophy or 
– to be more precise – an attempt simultaneously at realizing and historicizing 
philosophy as a highly original historical social theory as Gramsci has suggested? Do 
Gramsci and Althusser represent two different and even opposing approaches to th ese 
questions? 
I think that the parallel reading of Gramsci’s and Althusser’s conceptions of 
philosophy make it evident that they both shared in fact many elements and that any 
rethinking of the specific modality of a materialist practice of philosophy today must 
confront these conceptions.  
Both Althusser and Gramsci stress that philosophy should be conceived not as a 
speculative system-building, but as a particular practice of philosophy, as a form of 
intervention in a theoretical terrain with historical and political determinations, and as a 
constant conceptual experimentation. They both insisted on the close links between 
philosophy, ideology and politics and the deeply political character of philosophical 
debates and confrontations and their relation to the emergence of hegemonic politics. 
They both link philosophy to a particular conception of the intellectuality of politics 
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Both Gramsci and Althusser shared the same apprehension of the historical and 
political dynamics traversing theory in general and also of the historical and political 
efficacy of theory in its articulation to social and political movements and dynamics. In 
particular, they both pay attention to the dialectical relation between ideology and 
theory, to how mass ideologies evolve and are transformed by theoretical developments, 
and at the same time to how the social dynamics and aspirations associated with the 
political struggles of the subaltern classes can affect and transform theories.  
Both Gramsci and Althusser have the same apprehension that philosophy is the 
crucial theoretical terrain for the emergence of this dialectic of theory, ideology and 
politics. They both understand that philosophy is a sort of a laboratory of new ideas, 
metaphors, notions, conceptual frameworks, that is within philosophy that new ideas 
and theories can be forged and adjusted according to the exigencies and dynamics of the 
historical conjuncture. They were both fully aware of the role of philosophy in the 
formation and elaboration of hegemony and specific hegemonic projects, in the sense 
that it is within philosophy where the ideologies and worldviews of potentially 
hegemonic classes – and also the resistances of subaltern classes – are transformed into 
theory and strategic ideology.  
Both Gramsci and Althusser also share the same distrust against any form of 
metaphysical materialism. Both Gramsci’s conception of immanence and Althusser’s 
insistence on materialism as a negation of any teleology of Origin and Telos point to the 
same direction of a non-ontological materialism, a materialism that points towards the 
primacy of practice, either historical/political or theoretical, towards the actual historicity 
of thought, to the constant efficacy of social interactions and antagonisms. In this sense, 
we can see both positions as useful in any attempt to rethink of Marxist philosophy as 
militant materialist practice of philosophy. I also think that some of Althusser’s 
questions concerning the theoretical status of Marxist theory, especially his insistence 
that a potentially scientific theory of history cannot be articulated in traditional 
philosophical terms, but needs a novel theoretical apparatus, are still of value, despite 
Althusser’s own shortcomings in answering them. I am not suggesting a return to  
Althusser’s early scientism and his idealized conception of science as rigidly separated 
from ideology, which is in fact a reprise of the idealist distinction between truth and 
falsity. Nor do I suggest that we must think critical social theory only in terms of an 
“ideal type” of science, or treat all forms of philosophically inspired social theorizing as 
some form of non-theory. However, I insist that Marxist theory of history represents a 
theoretical modality different than traditional philosophy, and requires a different 
conception of theory and a strong claim to the intelligibility of social reality as at the 
same time “historical-practical” and “objective”, even though any actual attempt at such 
theorizing would be necessarily uneven and inherently contradictory. As a result 
Gramsci’s effort to rethink a radically novel historical materialism through the vocabulary 
of classical Marxism and historicist philosophy, as well as his insight that post -
renaissance philosophy has to be studied as the theoretical expression of a more general 
historical movement, need to be considered as starting points rather than definitive 
answers. In a certain way, both position point to the open, unfinished and inherently 
experimental character of historical materialism both as theoretical and political project. 
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Both Gramsci and Althusser realize that the philosophical practice for a new 
potential proletarian hegemony cannot be symmetrical to idealist philosophical system, 
since the traditional philosophical form is determined not only by idealism but also by its 
relation to dominant ideologies and the reproduction of relations of domination and 
exploitation. In this sense, and despite Althusser’s repeated opposition between his call 
for a new practice of philosophy and Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis, both Althusser’s 
insistence on a new practice, a new way to intervene in philosophy, and Gramsci ’s quest 
for a new and original philosophy of praxis, immanence and historicity are referring to 
the same challenge of a philosophy for communism. 
Moreover, it is also important to stress certain affinities between Gramsci’s notion 
of praxis (and its origin in Marx’s reference to “revolutionäre Praxis”) and Althusser’s 
references to the centrality of practices. Especially in the Initiation to Philosophy Althusser 
articulates his argument about the role of philosophy through references to the centrality 
of practices, the fact that wherever there are practices one can also see “abstractions”, 
namely relations that determine concrete social practices, and the role of philosophy in 
dealing with abstractions. For Althusser, the particular role of philosophy has exactly to 
do with the encounter between science, class politics and ideology and also with the 
reflection in theoretical terms of this relational “abstract” character of social relations. 
Wherever there are practices, one can find social relations that determine them, relations 
that represent the “abstract” aspect of reality, the relations that in their reproduction lead 
to the reproduction of these concrete “singular” practices. And wherever there are these 
abstractions, one can see theories and ideologies, in the last instances determined by 
social struggles and antagonisms, and this can account for the constant re-emergence of 
philosophy as a specific form of theoretical practice, as a battlefield for hegemony. 
Althusser’s intervention in theory and the balance of forces within ideology and science, 
this struggle of words against words, this forging of new metaphors and new conce pts, 
this form of collective theoretical creativity (another common trait of Gramsci and 
Althusser is this emphasis on the creative character of philosophical interventions ), is 
itself a practice, and as Althusser himself admits, when he refers to the Aris totelian 
distinction between poiesis and praxis, a form of praxis, namely the “identity of the 
transformation of the object (the relation of forces) and of the subject (the organized 
revolutionary class)”. 
And indeed I think that today, faced with the limits (as well as the importance and 
insights) of much of current post-historicist and post-humanist radical theorizing with its 
refusal of any claims to scientificity and its return to a more philosophical drawing of 
lines of demarcation, we still need to elaborate and produce an adequate conceptual 
apparatus for a Marxist theory that would be at the same time historical, critical, reflexive 
but also with a strong claim at producing some sort of “knowledge effect”. In this effort 
it is obvious that Marxist philosophy can indeed play an important role, neither as the 
guarantor of scientificity, nor as a simple deconstructing of idealist tendencies, but as a 
crucial theoretical laboratory, a testing ground, a theoretical terrain of experimentation. 
And to deal with this challenge we need both Althusser’s warnings against the inherent 
idealism of philosophical elaborations but also Gramsci’s insight that philosophy has still 
a positive role to play in the development of Marxist theory. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This parallel reading and the attempt to highlight some of the affinities between 
the Gramscian and the Althusserian projects can offer us valuable insights about how to 
rethink Marxist philosophy, or in general any conception of a philosophy for communism . 
In contrast to both a temptation towards a return of grand-scale quasi ontological 
thinking – something evident, at least as a tendency, in some of Alain Badiou’s post-Being 
and Event thinking – and a rejection of philosophy tout court, in Gramsci and Althusser we 
see an attempt towards the redefinition of a new practice of philosophy, a practice of 
philosophy that while being philosophical, also attempts to avoid the shortcomings 
associated with the traditional philosophical form. 
In a certain way, for both Gramsci and Althusser, philosophy is both unavoidable 
(the contradictions emerging at the intersection of science, ideology and class struggle, 
necessarily take a specifically philosophical form) and necessary: we need a new 
materialist and historical practice of philosophy as a theoretical laboratory as a way to 
forge not only new concepts but also new forms of mass critical political intellectuality. 
And we need philosophy in order to be able to experiment with new ways of thinking in 
order exactly to be able to think about how to experiment with new social forms and 
relations, new practices and terrains of experimentation for new social and political 
configurations. We need a philosophy for communism. 
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